the BLACKLIST

a list of people/companies that you will not want to do business with
NOTES: This site is now updated and is presented in sequence of events as occurred. Following is the background to this 'event' and thereafter is latest News.. including details as to how trustee/accounting firms, specifically KPMG, and lawyers are deserving of their 'reputations' .
In fact, from our experience they are really no better than the frauds they are defending.
SCROLL down the page and read on.

the WHO and WHAT (the Details)
... as of JANUARY 1998

No. 289 Taurus Ventures Ltd., and related numbered companies including 544553 BC Ltd. (the reg owner of property at 8910 River Rd/Delta), and 429155 BC Ltd. (registered owners of properties at 8875 and8894 River Rd/Delta)... and Prema Systems (and other Prema related co.'s at these locations). The principal to note here is an individual named Barry Ferguson (aka - the Maggot). This maggot has a history of screwing subcontractors, suppliers and investors dating back more than 10 years to the late 1980's. 

Other registered shareholders (as of January 01, 1998) in these properties include Theodore (Ted) Myrah (a long time associate of Ferguson), Wayne Taylor, and one James L. Williams (Ottawa, ON)

 

 Since June of 1997 through September of 1998, in excess of $2,500,000 in supplies and services has been "contributed" to these individuals and organizations by various subcontractors and suppliers. It has become apparent that these slime bags have exactly no intention of ever making payment and in fact deliberately undertook to defraud the creditor individuals and legitimate, honest business. 

These people are located at 8910 River Road in Delta, BC (the Big "A" Frame building). You may have seen/heard that this location is touted to become the largest "movies studio" north of LosAngeles. 

The bottom line here is that if this character or any of his associates, or related organizations call for goods or services.. either get CASH (the checks aren't much good either) or go the other way. 

If you are a mobile crane service and you are contacted by any of these characters or these organizations, or if you are contracted by anyone to supply services on this site be aware that this site is blacklisted. Your cooperation will be appreciated.

Before hanging up on them, you might also suggest to this "slick Willie" to PAY HIS BILLS.

    Estate No. 191682/99
    Estate No. 191684/99
    Estate No. 191683/99
    Vancouver Registry

IN THE MATTER OF THE BANKRUPTCIES OF
NO.289 TAURUS VENTURES LTD. & PREMA SYSTEMS LTD. & 544553 B.C. LTD

(by FAX - 1 page)
February 4, 2004
To the Unsecured Creditors

$1,327,732.18 That’s how much the inspectors in the subject bankruptcies have discovered should probably be going back into the bankrupts’ estates for legal distribution as prescribed in the Bankruptcy & Insolvency Act.  The trouble is, most of this amount was extracted from the estates by one of the principals of the bankrupt companies and his lawyers and accountants of choice.  As the inspectors have come to understand the workings of the Bankruptcy & Insolvency Act, the Superintendent of Bankruptcy and the Courts take their instructions from these very same lawyers and accountants, who are referred to as Officers of the Courts.

$100,000.00 was promised the creditors by the first trustee (KPMG) if they accepted the proposal.  This trustee promptly gobbled this $100,000 in accounting / trustee’s fees, even though the second trustee clearly indicated that the first trustee has no such entitlement.

$489,900.00 or more was taken from the companies by one of the principals and his family during the one year preceding the original date of the proposal and during the year following the this date, all considered reviewable transactions under the Bankruptcy & Insolvency Act as these withdrawals are violations.

$280,401.18 due to an unsecured creditor was traded by that creditor to the principals for services in lieu, this through an exchange of communiqués in which the primary concern was clearly that of making this trade of debt for services look like it had been made more than a year prior to the date of the proposal, which it wasn’t. 

$457,431.00 in the estates’ assets was taken by the principals’ primary law firms less than a month after the date of the proposal to satisfy their unsecured claims.  Inspectors have spoken with other lawyers to determine the appropriateness of such action and not one lawyer, even a Queen’s Counsel, has been able to defend this action and their profession.  Their disdain for these actions of their colleagues is obvious.

    The inspectors have developed a 12 page executive summary of the 730 pages of evidence found supporting the above and other allegations of apparently miscreant activity in the conduct of these bankruptcy files.  The objective is to have the courts order the Superintendent of Bankruptcy or some other appropriate authority to investigate wrongdoing and prosecute accordingly.  If you wish to receive this executive summary to determine whether or not you want your lawyer to advise the most economical route to justice here, just fax this page back to (604) 468-6870.  Perhaps one or more of you think enough of your Member of Parliament that you may wish to get he or she involved as well.  The inspectors have been working and producing copies of evidence on their own time and that their own expense, so please don’t request the 730 pages of supporting documentation unless a lawyer is going to give the material a thorough review and promises to give the inspectors a response with recommendations.  The bog is about to be sold.  Whether or not recovery by the unsecured creditors is still possible remains unknown.  It is known that the principals and their professional help are still at large and thriving.

February 4, 2003
(first presented to unsecured creditors December 4/03)

Estate No. 192080 / 191682/99
Estate No. 192079 / 191684/99
Estate No. 192078 / 191683/99
Vancouver Registry

IN THE MATTER OF THE BANKRUPTCIES OF
NO.289 TAURUS VENTURES LTD. & PREMA SYSTEMS LTD. & 544553 B.C. LTD.

This is a request for a Mandamus Writ ordering the Superintendent of Bankruptcy of Canada to either carry out his responsibilities in the subject bankruptcies, responsibilities he professed to have in the Inspectors’ Handbook he gave to the inspectors appointed to help in the subject matter, or, should the Court conclude it necessary, help a more appropriate authority take charge of dealing with the issues raised hereafter.  There is clear evidence that substantial assets belonging to the estates are not being pursued, though they must be by law.


The Appointment of KPMG as Trustee under a Proposal

1. A Proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act was filed with the Official Receiver at the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy on November 8, 1999.  The first meeting of creditors to consider this Proposal from the subject bankrupts took place on November 29, 1999 at the invitation of the Trustee under the Proposal, KPMG Inc.  This material is included hereafter as Exhibit A.  The Proposal, in an amended form approved at the second meeting of creditors, was for the unsecured creditors to give the bankrupts about a month to come up with the funds necessary to pay the entire amount of their outstanding accounts. 

2. The Official Receiver, Mr. David Hoyt, lost control of the first meeting of creditors from the outset.  Various creditors accused the directors of the companies in the Proposals of having a long and unbroken record of commercial turpitude.  The principle source of this information was reports prepared by the Institute of Chartered Accountants and by KPMG, two organizations the Trustee, Mr. Bob Rusko, was and is a member of.  The Trustee’s response was to ponder how his awareness of this confidential information could become public.  He most certainly acknowledged his awareness.   A sample of this widely known and easily obtainable information is included hereafter as Exhibit B.  The preponderance of dealings in and with countries renowned for their impenetrable banking systems should be noted.

3. Despite protestations by the creditors, Mr. Hoyt dogmatically ensured that KPMG was appointed Trustee under the Proposal.  Lawyers in the room pointed out to Mr. Hoyt the inappropriateness of his method of validating creditors’ voting rights.  They also showed him where in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act creditors were permitted to substitute a Trustee.  Mr. Hoyt ignored the law and the lawyers, and KPMG were in.  A lawyer acting for a large group of the creditors sent a letter to KPMG’s lawyers detailing the charges against KPMG.  She made no attempt to explain the outrageous conduct of the Official Receiver.  A copy of her letter follows as Exhibit C.  Mr. Hoyt is no longer the Official Receiver, but continues to be employed by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy. 
 
   
The Proposal and the Truth       

The Proposal, herein presented as Exhibit A, is what the Unsecured Creditors relied upon when making their decision on how to attempt collection of their accounts through acceptance or rejection of the Proposal.  It is indicated in the Proposal that “There were limited financial records available to the Trustee and as a result, this report is substantially based on financial information provided by management.  The Trustee has not audited this information.”  However, the Official Receiver and the Trustee both knew that the Directors of the bankrupt companies had a very sordid commercial past and that more than the usual precautions would be needed to maintain any credibility in these proceedings.  Without financial records it is obvious no audit or even cursory review could have been performed.  However, there are documents that were readily available from third parties that could and should have been referred to in attempting to evaluate the credibility of what the directors were telling the Trustee and the Official Receiver.  Given that there was a mysterious lack of accounting records in a group whose financial head had earned not one but two professional accounting designations, given that the first meeting of creditors was being held almost two years after the unsecured creditors’ accounts began going into arrears, and given that there are almost half a million dollars in legal fees on the lists of unsecured creditors in a relatively small construction project, extreme caution was clearly required of the Official Receiver and the Trustee.  Most damning of all, the details that were available will clearly demonstrate that the Official Receiver and the Trustee knew that the Proposal was a lie from the outset because documents proving so, and included later herein, came through their respective offices prior to the first meeting of creditors.                 
In the “Background” and “Causes of Difficulties” sections of the Proposal, on pages 1 through 4 of Exhibit A, we were given the picture of a well thought out business plan that was wantonly undermined by a recalcitrant tenant and a singularly uncooperative bank.  The embattled directors were portrayed as having been thrust into penury despite a courageous effort to carry on their good works, reduced to subsisting on a meager diet of parking and landfill tipping fees.   In fact, the entire episode described took less than a year, the amount of unpaid rents the bankrupts thought they were entitled to were relatively insignificant, the bank was so magnanimous that its actions are considered outrageous by all other bankers we have spoken to, and the truck park and landfill were yielding millions of dollars annually, substantial amounts of which were said to have been delivered in cash under cover of darkness, and substantial amounts of which were diverted to the personal holding company bank account of one of the directors of the bankrupt companies.           

4. The Proposal focuses on a $5,000,000 building project, financed by the Royal Bank of Canada.  The building, referred to as the A-frame, was to serve as a movie studio.  The Royal Bank of Canada’s Confirmation of Credit Facilities follows as Exhibit D.  This Exhibit also includes an Affidavit from the Royal Bank official who approved the loan and the subsequent draws against the loan, all supported by the paperwork underlying those draws.   The Affidavit was sworn almost a year before the first meeting of creditors and would obviously have been available to the Official Receiver, given that the Royal Bank is intimately involved as the principle secured creditor of the bankrupt.  The following should be noted:
a.    There is no requirement in the loan facility document for an independent Quantity Surveyor to ensure that the work claimed for in the draw requests was, in fact, performed.  The only approval required is that of an employee of No. 289 Taurus Ventures Ltd. / 544553 B.C. Ltd.  This is what all others in the banking community find so astounding.  
b.    In Schedule A of the Confirmation of Credit Facilities there is a requirement that a “Separate bank account is to be operated for the project loan.”  In each of the draw requests the borrower swears that all suppliers have been paid, or that he has monies for the suppliers’ unpaid invoices held in trust with payment pending.  The Official Receiver and Trustee simply had to have the Royal Bank provide them with copies of the transactions in the project bank account to see where loan proceeds were or were not being spent.  If the Official Receiver or Trustee discovered that there was no such account for the loan and that draws were being advanced without an independent Quantity Surveyor verifying values being presented by people they knew had an unbroken record of commercial turpitude, they must clearly have known that their Proposal was essentially a farrago of completely misleading information.
c.    In the Affidavit it can be seen that all advances were made within four months of the Credit Facilities having come into being.  The only funds not advanced appear to be the traditional 10% of the $2,000,000 construction portion of the loan normally held back until an occupancy permit is granted and the borrower certifies that all costs have been paid.  In the Proposal it is suggested that the building was not considered by the bankrupts to be substantially complete until June 1998, half a year after the last advance was given them under the Credit Facilities.  The bankrupts never requested the amount held back, presumably because in the opinion of the Royal Bank they never qualified for the final advance.  Indeed, to the best of our knowledge no occupancy permit has ever been issued for this part of the building, and the wiring and acoustical insulation required to make it a functioning studio were never even contemplated by the bankrupts.
d.    Subsequent to our initial review of Royal Bank material we discovered what is now included as Exhibit D-1.  The first page of this exhibit is a standard comfort letter sent to one of the unpaid creditors who was trying to determine when he could expect payment.  This page was faxed to one of the inspectors and, though the creditor mistakenly suggests the letter was received before he delivered his goods (he had done based on some previous verbal assurance), the timing is what is significant.  The Royal Bank’s account manager who was administering the construction loan prepared the letter, dated March 11, 1998.  On the other page of this exhibit is a letter from a Royal Bank official giving details and amounts of the payments made by the writer of the March 11, 1998 letter, each payment being in response to a Draw Request Form swearing that, as you can see in Exhibit D,
    “8.  Any and all funds received from the lender previously as advances under the loan agreement have been expended or are being held in trust solely for the purpose for which they were advanced; no item of construction costs previously certified to the lender with a request for advance remains unpaid as of the date of this certificate; and no part of said funds has been nor any part of the funds to be received pursuant to this request for advance shall be used for any other purpose.  Further, there are no trade or supplier disputes.”   

For the Senior Account Manager to send out a comfort letter to disgruntled creditors three months after the final loan advance appears more like the action of a zealous shareholder than that of a prudent bank official.  Note the second last sentence in the comfort letter: “We would consider them responsible for their commitments.” 

5. The accusation in the Proposal that the unpaid rent was a material contributing factor in the demise of the bankrupts is not supported by the facts.  The lease agreement entered into follows hereafter as Exhibit E. Again, this is a document that was readily available to the Official Receiver and the Trustee and could and should have been looked to for corroboration of management’s claims.  If we were to accept the supposition that no monthly rent was paid from the beginning of the lease, August 17, 1997, to the time the building was, according to the bankrupts, ready for occupancy, May 31, 1998, a total of between $236,250 and $264,735 in monthly rents would have been unpaid.  However, and as is acknowledged in the lease, the bankrupts were given a $500,000 down payment on the rents.  In the Royal Bank’s affidavit included in Exhibit D, specifically on page 9 of 52, it can be seen that the Royal Bank poured almost $1,800,000 into the bankrupts’ accounts in late 1997.  Given the vast sums unpaid to trades people, as shown in Exhibit F hereafter with a “T” notation beside the amount owed, the bankrupts were obviously swimming in money throughout the construction project.  Accounts so noted with a “T” total some $983,000, or $702,000 if the $281,000 owed to Bel Construction Ltd. is left out, this for reasons that will be made apparent later in this submission (to do with Exhibit W).  It is vitally important to note that this entire document, Exhibit F, is a fax transmission from the office of the Trustee Under the Proposal to the Official Receiver, as can be seen by examining the top and bottom of each page therein.  We obtained this clean copy from the current Official Receiver on March 19, 2003 at the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.  The transmission is clearly dated November 8, 1999, a full three weeks before the first meeting of creditors.  The bankrupts had lots of money from the tenant and the Royal Bank during construction, and obviously very little of it was going to its intended purpose.  The Official Receiver knew it.  The Trustee knew it.  The Proposal was a complete fabrication, and they both knew it.



The Conduct of the Official Receiver and Trustee Under the Proposal

6. In the “Summary of Proposal” section of the Proposal, appearing herein on page 5 of 22 of Exhibit A, there is a declaration that “A $50,000 payment has been paid to the Trustee to back up this commitment.” the commitment being to pay 100% of the unsecured creditors’ accounts within about a month.  A week later this amount was raised to $100,000 at the next meeting of creditors where the Proposal was ultimately approved.  The Trustee characterized this payment as non-refundable and strictly for the exclusive use of the unsecured creditors, to be used either to pay a portion of the monies owed the unsecured creditors or for the investigation of affairs of the bankrupts if the Proposal was defaulted upon.  Two things are of vital importance here.  First of all, there can be no doubt that the Trustee and Official Receiver knew that the creditors were left with the impression that the $100,000 was exclusively for the purpose described by the Trustee.  There was no suggestion that this money could be swallowed up by professional fees.  Included hereafter as Exhibit G is an exchange of correspondence the Inspectors had with the Division Assistant Superintendent of the Vancouver Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.  The Inspectors in the bankruptcies originally prepared the letter to the Division Assistant Superintendent, but it was materially refined by, and essentially became the work of the Trustee in the Bankruptcies, Mr. David Gray of Campbell Saunders Ltd.  In Exhibit R you will see that Mr. Gray spent two hours on October 19, 2000 in crafting this letter, and then spent more time on October 30, 2000 in reviewing it.  With considerable pride in his own workmanship he rendered his final draft to the inspectors at their meeting of November 2, 2000.  The response we received from the Division Assistant Superintendent demonstrates how profoundly inappropriate the conduct of the Office of the Superintendent had become. 
a.    The Division Assistant Superintendent ignores KPMG’s previous involvement with the bankrupts as clearly outlined in our letter.  He then adds insult to injury by saying the creditors should have “pursued substitution of the trustee” as permitted “pursuant to Section 14 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.”  You will see at the bottom of the second page of Exhibit C that that is precisely what the creditors attempted to do at the first meeting but were prevented from doing so by the Division Assistant Superintendent’s own employee, the Official Receiver.
b.    He refutes the Bias of the Trustee and of the Official Trustee by describing what the Official Receiver was doing between the first and second meetings of creditors, thus neatly side-stepping the fact that the Official Receiver had already demonstrated his complete bias at the first meeting, again as clearly described in Exhibit C.    
c.    He completely ignores the real issue of how the Trustee and the Official Receiver misled the creditors with regard to the $100,000 and professional fees. He does so simply by describing the vast number of ways the law allows and helps professionals to mislead the public.  The fact that the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act facilitates such flagrant misrepresentation through the abuse of plain English was what we were complaining about in the first place, not what we needed explained to us by a bureaucrat whose wages we are paying.
d.    He tries to defend the indefensible in the Cash Flow Projections using essentially the same blinders worn when dealing with the priority of professional fees.  The priority is irrelevant if such fees are supposed to be getting paid by someone else.  There was no indication from the Official Receiver or the Trustee that the latter and the lawyers were about to gobble up the estates with prodigious speed.  As well, the District Assistant Superintendent suggests that the fees were, in fact, paid until “the approximate time of the first meeting of creditors.”  On the last page of Exhibit H hereafter you will see a summary of KPMG invoices submitted by the Trustee in the Proposal for his fees to be extracted from the estates of the bankrupts in this matter at a taxation hearing.  The first four invoices for services charged to the estates by the Trustee in the Proposal, and claimed in the Trustee’s Statement of Receipts and Disbursements, totaling about $29,700, were clearly dated prior to the first meeting of creditors.  What is very alarming is that there will almost certainly prove to have been an additional $13,000 to $14,000 in Trustee’s fees occurring prior to the first meeting of creditors, claimed but unaccounted for, as will be described in the next section.  

7. The inspectors received the first 61 pages of Exhibit H by fax on January 25, 2001 from the law firm of Campney & Murphy who at the time were representing a number of the unsecured creditors in the subject bankruptcies.  Though the cover sheet from Campney & Murphy suggested that a total of 60 pages would be received in the fax transmission, the last page received, as can be seen from the band of electronic information at the top of the pages, is page 59.  Presumably there was a transmission problem at the source and Campney & Murphy then sent pages 60 and 61 of Exhibit H, preceded by a cover sheet not included here.  For each of the bankrupt companies a Trustee’s Statement of Receipts and Disbursements such as that on page 64 of Exhibit H was prepared, each representing one third of the combined estates.  Hence, where on this page 64 we see $33,161.27 in total Trustee’s fees including the GST thereon, the total for the estates is three times that amount, or $99,483.81.  However, when one of the inspectors took a preliminary look at this material it was discovered that the invoices submitted to support KPMG’s claim only totaled $84,964.05, as summarized on page 65 of Exhibit H.  As a result, Campney & Murphy sent to KPMG the 4-page fax included in Exhibit H as pages 62, 63, 64 and 65.
Upon further review by one of the inspectors of the Exhibit H material, this discrepancy appears to have arisen because there is no invoice for their activities after October 29, 1999 as shown on the KPMG invoice V 41364, page 45 in Exhibit H, and before November 25, 1999 as seen on the KPMG invoice V 48019, on page 47 of the same exhibit.  There is no reason to believe that Campney & Murphy removed these pages from the original of what they faxed to the inspectors.  As mentioned earlier, they indicated on their cover sheet that 60 pages were sent, and the first 59 as evidenced here arrived as sent, with the missing last page and one additional page being transmitted a few moments later.  The billings from KPMG assist the inspectors, and presumably those taxing their accounts, in determining what work was being done for the amounts charged.  It is thus very disturbing to be prevented from knowing what was going on for almost the entire month leading up to the first meeting of creditors.  It doesn’t seem plausible that one of the world’s foremost accounting firms would make such an error, given the meticulous care everyone has been alleging that the professionals are required to take in this type of matter.
What is extremely disturbing is that there are also two pages missing elsewhere in the supporting material.  Page 47 of Exhibit H is the first page of KPMG invoice V 48019.  The following page, 48 of 65 in the exhibit as faxed by Campney & Murphy to the Inspectors, is page 3 of KPMG invoice V 48019.  What is missing is page 2 of invoice V 48019 that, by process of elimination, must include, among other things, the first two meetings of creditors and whatever else went on between November 25, 1999 and December 3, 1999.
The final invoice copy submitted by KPMG in support of their Trustee’s Statement of Receipts and Disbursements is not given an invoice number in the copy supplied to Campney & Murphy, and is included in Exhibit H as pages 58 and 59, which are also the page numbers in the fax transmission from Campney & Murphy.  However, these two pages represent pages 1 and 3 of this final invoice, the “3” at the top of page 59 being part of the typical KPMG numbering.  It might be suggested that a mechanical problem late in the fax transmission may have caused page 2 of the invoice to go missing.  In fact, when we look at page 61 of Exhibit H we will see the costing summary that follows each KPMG invoice, and this is the page that was missing from the original transmission from Campney & Murphy.  To suggest that Campney & Murphy miscounted the number of pages in the 60-page transmission they originally intended is not reasonable as, by virtue of the supplementary transmission, only one page arrived that was different from those sent at the end of the original transmission.  It is not known if Campney & Murphy would have anything to gain by filleting the KPMG material before sending it on to the inspectors.  The inspectors and those taxing the submission were thus left with no idea of what KPMG was charging the estates for after April 5, 2000 and before August 24, 2000. 
                        
8. Included herein as Exhibit I are the messages sent to Campney & Murphy and Campbell Saunders Ltd. on March 24, 2003 to determine if an answer was ever received to the fax sent by Campney & Murphy on January 29, 2001, the one included earlier herein as pages 62, 63, 64 and 65 of Exhibit H.  Also included in Exhibit I is a copy of a fax sent on March 25, 2003 to the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy requesting its assistance in obtaining the pages missing from Exhibit H.  In the telephone conversation referred to in the fax to Campney & Murphy, the first page in Exhibit I, Ms. Heather Ferris of Campney & Murphy did not say if she received a reply to her January 29, 2001 fax or not.  Campbell Saunders Ltd. did not reply at all, even though Ms. Ferris said all material in these bankruptcies was being forwarded to Campbell Saunders Ltd.  Almost a month after the March 24 and 25, 2003 faxes were sent, the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy sent what purports to be a response, also included in Exhibit I.  This refers to the March 25, 2003 fax, but goes to great lengths to in no way respond to it. 
The request made on January 29, 2001 by Ms. Ferris was a perfectly reasonable one; a request that would have quickly corrected what initially appeared to be just a clerical oversight.  We have been made to understand that the cooperation amongst professionals and bureaucrats working with the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act is exemplary, a model of harmony within our justice system.  Indeed, even with all the invective incorporated in Mr. Gray’s letter about KPMG, referred to earlier herein as part of Exhibit G, Mr. Gray was still heard to say that: “We need to work with these people.”  Thus, it only remains now to determine who is covering up for whom.             

9. In the preamble to the Proposal given at the first meeting of creditors, at the bottom of page three in Exhibit A, the Trustee states: “Currently the only revenue earned comes from a truck park and a subsidiary which charges land fill tipping fees.”  However, in the Trustee’s Further Updated Cash Flow Projections for the three bankrupt companies, shown in various places throughout Exhibit H, it will be seen that the only revenue selected for recording therein, from May 10, 1999 (the date of the filing of the Notice of Intention to File a Proposal) to the time of the first creditors meeting on November 29, 1999, were parking fees and some rent.  Included hereafter as Exhibit J is a copy of a letter sent by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy for Canada from Ottawa to a group of creditors in the subject bankruptcy.  In his letter the Superintendent confirms at the bottom of page 2 that the revenues of a wholly owned subsidiary belong to the parent company.  From page 22 of Exhibit A you can see that the Official Receiver and the Trustee knew that Delta Shake & Shingle (1989) Ltd., the “…subsidiary which charges land fill tipping fees.”, is a wholly owned subsidiary of one of the bankrupt companies.  As the Superintendent in Ottawa clearly pointed out, the subsidiary’s revenue therefore belongs to the parent company.  Included hereafter as Exhibit K is a summary of the cash flow in and out of that subsidiary, the revenues coming from land fill tipping fees, just as described by the Official Receiver and Trustee in their preamble to the Proposal.  The Inspectors in the bankruptcies acquired the information in Exhibit K simply by requesting copies of bank statements and supporting information from the bank.  The Official Receiver and the Trustee in the Proposal, knowing since the May 10, 1999 filing date that the accounting records had for the most part been hidden, could easily have asked the bank for this same information and would have received it well in advance of the first meeting of creditors.  The bank statements used to compile Exhibit K are included in the supplementary section of material at the very back of the exhibits, indexed as Supplementary K–1.  The copies of cheques paid out from the Delta Shake & Shingle (1989) Ltd. account that appear relevant to the operation of a garbage dump have not been included herein, but can be made available should they be considered in any way pertinent.   

10. Referring again to the Organization Chart that the Official Receiver and Trustee submitted as their Appendix H in the Proposal, which appears herein as page 22 of Exhibit A, we can see another wholly owned subsidiary of the bankrupt companies, this one called 546414 B.C. Ltd.   In May 1999, at the time of the filing of the Notice of Intention to File a Proposal, this company’s bank account suddenly became active and remained so until about the time the Proposal was defaulted upon.  An analysis of the money flowing through this account was made by one of the inspectors and is submitted hereafter as Exhibit M.  The bank statements from which this information was gathered are included in the supplementary section of material at the very back of the exhibits, indexed as Supplementary M-1.  Of the almost half million dollars that went through, about $40,000 appear related to real estate transactions or the collection of rent.  Again, had the Official Receiver and the Trustee bothered to do even the cursory bit of due diligence suggested in section 8 above, asking banks for copies of their records where company records had disappeared, they would have known of this account and the substantial sums being diverted through it. 

11. Through the two accounts mentioned in section 9 and 10 above, for Delta Shake & Shingle (1989) Ltd. and 546414 B.C. Ltd. respectively, we found vast sums of money flowing, albeit by an elliptical route, to the personal holding company (See Exhibit L) of one of the directors and owners of the bankrupt companies, Mr. Barry Ferguson, and to the former owner of Delta Shake & Shingle (1989) Ltd., Mr. Robert Brown, who continued as a signing officer of that company.   This flow of payments is summarized hereafter as Exhibit N.  Copies of the payments summarized are included in the supplementary section at the back, and indexed as Supplementary N-1. 

Money was being diverted to one of the directors of the bankrupts and to an officer of the wholly owned subsidiary, this from the time creditors accounts started going into arrears in early 1998, right through the date of the Trustee’s filing a Notice of Intention to File a Proposal Under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and on to the time of the meetings of creditors in late 1999.  The director took one such circuitously achieved payment, for $4,000, just three days before the filing of the Notice to File a Proposal, and took another one a week later, this time for $16,000.  Indeed, on the very day the Proposal was approved on December 3, 1999, he took another draw of $7,000.  Over a 14-month period, ending in mid-December 1999, this director had taken out almost half a million dollars that we know of, - all of it the property of the estates, as so carefully described by Canada’s Superintendent of Bankruptcy.  The amounts of these diversions are staggering.  The fact that the Official Receiver and the Trustee chose to ignore these diversions seems almost criminal.  The best light we can put on these events, with almost $300,000 disappearing right out from under the noses of the Official Receiver and the Trustee between the time of filing the Notice of Intention and the first meeting of creditors, is that these diversions were facilitated by a level of incompetence heretofore unimaginable within the ranks of Canadian bureaucrats and professionals.
  

The Inspectors and the Trustee In Bankruptcy       

The inspectors in the subject bankruptcies were given an Inspectors’ Handbook when we assumed our responsibilities.  We most reasonably assumed that this Handbook gave an accurate portrayal of the rights, responsibilities and authorities of everyone whose official position was mentioned therein.  Indeed, in its INTRODUCTION we are told, “This booklet is offered as a guide to inspectors acting under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “Act”).”  A copy of this booklet is attached as Exhibit O.  The Inspectors looked to Part III – MEASURES AGAINST BANKRUPTCY ABUSES in the Inspectors’ Handbook as the articulation of the support we would receive from government officials, specifically from the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, as detailed in 3.1 Powers of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.  3.2 in Part III deals with Statutory Offences and lists eight specific offences a bankrupt might be found guilty of.  The Handbook does not give any guidance to inspectors as to how they should deal with curious behavior by the Official Receiver, Trustees or Lawyers. 
In the preceding pages we have pointed out all the wrongdoings the Official Receiver and the Trustee Under the Proposal had to have been aware of.  We have also strongly intimated that the behaviour of some of the professionals and bureaucrats involved have been perplexing in the extreme.  Using the Inspectors’ Handbook as our guide, specifically subsection 3.2 Statutory Offences and Offences by Bankrupts; we hereafter attempt to summarize our observations, including additional information that further calls into question the conduct of bureaucrats and professionals with responsibilities in this matter.  We have darkened and italicized excerpts from the Inspectors Handbook.

      
Offences by Bankrupts

Section 198 deals with offences committed by a bankrupt and includes the following:
Any bankrupt who:

(a)    fails, without reasonable cause, to do any of the things required of him under section 158;
Section 158 of the Act is included hereafter as Exhibit P. This section lists Duties of Bankrupts that, if not carried out, could result in fines and or imprisonment, just as will any violation of Section 198. 
Subsections (a), (b) and (c) of Section 158 describe the obligation of the bankrupt to produce corporate financial records, including verbal submissions to be supplied under oath.  We have previously referred to the absence of records, and hereafter submit Exhibit Q.  This Exhibit is a letter of December 18, 2002 from David Gray, the Trustee of the Bankrupt Companies, to the inspectors.  Please note that before becoming Trustee of the Bankrupt Companies Mr. Gray had been appointed Receiver of Rents and was being paid by the Royal Bank whose lawyer eloquently explained to the Court that KPMG was letting significant amounts of money disappear from the Estates while serving as Trustee Under the Proposals. 
In Mr. Gray’s letter he bemoans the lack of records necessary for him to conduct his work: 
“ It is evident that until such a time as the books and records of the Bankrupt Companies are obtained, as well as the cooperation of the Directors, the Trustee will not be in a position to determine the potential for new sources of realization or recovery for the benefit of the Estates.”

He then goes on to say:
“ Notwithstanding the scarcity of information, the Trustee believes that there may be a potential benefit to the Estates both from the realization on as yet unidentified assets and from recoveries relating to reviewable transactions or preferential payments.”

As noted earlier, the Trustee knew that one of the directors had taken at least half a million the Trustee could go after.  As will be shown below, the bankrupts’ lawyers had another half million that looked suspiciously like property of the estates, and the Trustee knew that too when writing the December 2, 2002 letter.  He concludes his letter indicating that there are “insufficient funds in the Estates” for him to carry on his work.  If the creditors don’t wish to raise funds for him, they can become Trustee themselves. 
    Exhibit R is the Client Billing Worksheet Mr. Gray asked the inspectors to consider when he asked to have his fees approved at a meeting of creditors he convened on October 29, 2002.  We consider this Client Billing Worksheet to be as revealing as the KPMG renderings of Exhibit H appear obfuscating.  Mr. Gray has linked the recovery of records, reviewable transactions, preferential payments and the payment of Trustee’s fees in his letter, so here we will do the same. 
    As to the recovery of financial records, we see in Exhibit R that Mr. Gray spoke with Mr. Myrah, financial head of the bankrupts, in the year 2000 on June 6, June 9 and August 22.  Also in the apparent attempt to recover records we see Mr. Gray meeting with Mr. Myrah on June 22, 2000 at an undisclosed location.  And on November 3, 2000 Mr. Gray was to “travel to Ted Myrah re: books and records”.  Mr. Gray met with a couple of the inspectors on January 18, 2001 to explore boxes of financial records delivered at an unknown time to Butler Box at 925 Terminal Avenue in Vancouver.  The delays in getting any records and the almost complete lack of relevant records, this from a chief financial officer who had earned two professional accounting designations, did not cause the Trustee to put the officer under oath as he seems required to do under subsections (c) and (j) of Section 158.  To the best of our knowledge the chief financial officer has yet to be put under oath at any time in these proceedings, even after all the evidence suggesting misleading accounting activities and vast sums disappearing through payments to one of the principals.
    In Exhibit N we saw the substantial number and value of payments going from the Estates to the family and private holding company of one of the principals.  The inspectors were quite thrilled to discover that the Trustee has the authority to demand and receive copies of the banking records of this holding company, records that might divulge the ultimate destination of the money taken from the Estates.  Mr. Gray was also greatly encouraged by this turn of events, seemingly most anxious to finally get his hands on something truly useful to his mandate.  An assistant to Mr. Gray, Mr. J. Scott Cameron, was put in charge of acquiring this data.  Included hereafter is Exhibit S, Mr. Cameron’s first attempt at procuring the required information.  Please note that, though he sent his material to the correct financial institution, he was requesting information on one of the bankrupt companies’ wholly owned subsidiaries rather than on the principal’s holding company.  Though we weren’t provided with a copy of the corrected demand notice Mr. Cameron has insisted that he did subsequently send the proper demand to the proper financial institution.  As well, he insisted that he had made a similar demand for copies of transactions through a United Civic Savings account of one of the bankrupt companies, an account one of the inspectors was led to believe was significant in the pursuit of assets of the Estates.  To this day, we have never been led to believe that Campbell Saunders received the information requested.  For a number of months Mr. Cameron would periodically tell us that the two financial institutions, Canada Trust and United Civic Savings, were anxious to cooperate, and would ultimately provide us with the requested information.  For example, on July 13, 2001 in Exhibit R we see Mr. Cameron (JSC) charging time for discussing this with one of the inspectors.  After several months it became quite evident to the Inspectors that the two financial institutions must be stalling rather than waiting for a suitable time to cooperate.  Finally, the lawyer for one of the creditors contacted Canada Trust in November of 2002 and was told that they knew they were supposed to cooperate, but would only do so if taken to court, a process this lawyer estimated would cost upwards of $30,000 in legal fees.
    In hindsight, probably the greatest failing of the inspectors in trying to carry out their duties was their having consistently trusted the professionals and bureaucrats they came into contact with.  We’ve already gone to considerable lengths to explain how the KPMG Trustee appeared to mislead the creditors.  The lawyer from the now defunct law firm of Campney & Murphy, who originally represented a large group of the creditors, told a couple of these creditors how she had at one time successfully sued this particular Trustee Under the Proposal, Mr. Rusko of KPMG, because as Trustee in another matter he had converted some KPMG audit fees listed amongst the unsecured creditors into the high priority fees for his own Trusteeship.  When the lawyer tried to collect the money due under the court’s ruling she ultimately had to send a sheriff into KPMG’s offices to enforce the payment order.  The creditors were greatly encouraged by this revelation as it brought further credence to the argument that KPMG’s Mr. Rusko could not be trusted.  In large part because of this new information the group of creditors continued to use her services with the prospect of successfully prosecuting KPMG in a court action.  As they might have said on television, “We now had priors on them!”  When the inspectors later asked Mr. Cameron of Campbell Saunders to ask their then lawyer for the documentation of these events he reported back that she had said the case was more than 15 years old and off point for our purpose (see Exhibit T).  In other words, was it just a good story to whet our appetites for more legal fees, or was it something now being held back because, as Mr. Gray had said earlier, “We need to work with these people.”?   The inspectors were now beginning to wonder just how pervasive was this protocol of quid pro quo within the bankruptcy and insolvency industry.  We had, after all, been encouraged by her to strive to have Campbell Saunders appointed Trustee of the Bankrupt Companies, replacing KPMG who had been Trustee Under the Proposal.  All this serves as a preamble to a recent discovery made while preparing this submission. 
As indicated earlier, we considered the information expected from Canada Trust regarding the principals’ holding company bank account critical to our having success with the Estates.  There would in all likelihood be confirmation that the vast sums moving from the Estates to the principal were in complete contravention of subsections (f) and (g) of Section 158 (Exhibit P), and would represent an offense as defined in Section 198, subsection (g).  In the over two and a half years since Mr. Cameron of Campbell Saunders demanded information from Canada Trust, he had first been telling us that Canada Trust would cooperate, and then ultimately admitted that they wouldn’t.  When we first received Exhibit R none of us paid too much attention to it as we had been inundated with paper right from the outset of these proceedings, something we were beginning to think was an intentional attempt to overwhelm us.  We are, after all, just lay people trying to help our business or employers.  We must put our regular livelihoods first.  However, with the preparation of this submission now underway we have been forced to become as careful and thorough as possible, this to be as helpful to the Court as we can in what might be the final step in our duties as inspectors.  On page 31 of 50 in Exhibit R we have now discovered the following that we had earlier missed amongst Mr. Cameron’s activities of March 16, 2001, which was about a month after requesting information from Canada Trust:
3/16/01 JSC / BC CORPORATE
Received copies of Bank statements form (sic) Canada Trust for 373676                   BC Ltd. / initial review of transaction summary.     1.20 hours  @ 125.00

We are quite certain Mr. Cameron meant to say 373675 BC Ltd., the principal’s holding company, as there is no 373676 BC Ltd. according to the Registrar of Companies (see Exhibit U).  Mr. Cameron appears to have been deliberately concealing this vital information from the inspectors using an unending string of lies.  It would appear this included either misleading the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, or enlisting that office’s assistance in the deception, as can be seen in a copy of a fax we sent on June 19, 2001, included hereafter as Exhibit X.  The information must have been significant and probably rather voluminous as it held Mr. Cameron’s attention for over an hour.
    The inspectors have long wondered why there was such an extreme turnaround in our treatment at the hands of Campbell Saunders.  Exhibit G demonstrates the strong support the inspectors were receiving from David Gray in trying to right the wrongs perpetrated by the Trustee Under the Proposals.   After some apparently important documents were discovered amongst the financial records finally served up by the bankrupts, Campbell Saunders acted with what appeared to be sincere enthusiasm in making a demand for the personal banking information of one of the principals from Canada Trust.  However, within a month of the demand going out, and even before receiving the reply that Mr. Cameron withheld from the inspectors, Campbell Saunders Ltd. became openly hostile towards the inspectors.  Initially we thought this might have come about because of what subsequently became referred to as the police incident at the A-frame.  In hindsight, that incident now appears more likely to have been just the excuse Campbell Saunders needed to justify their new stance.  The “incident” can be gleaned without too much difficulty from the exchanges of communiqués making up Exhibit V.
    Shortly after assuming their duties some of the inspectors met at the A-frame with the Trustee and his head of security, Mr. Dale Cascanette of the company Hotel & Beverage Industry Solutions of Garibaldi Highlands, B.C.  One of the trustees pointed out that two ladies working for Mr. Cascanette as guards and rental yard managers were long time acquaintances of one the principals in the bankruptcy.  In fact, that inspector thought one of the ladies had at one time been the daughter-in-law of one of the principals, and strongly urged the Trustee, Mr. David Gray, to replace the ladies with people of more credible independence.  The Trustee gave his assurance that the inspectors had nothing to worry about.  Again, the inspectors naively trusted a professional member of the bankruptcy and insolvency industry. 
    Our naivety might have won the day for the Trustee had he chosen to see the humour in the “incident” and accept a bit of mea culpa for his staffing mistakes.  We had certainly been demonstrating our profound gullibility up to that point.  However, we must assume that the circumstances then uncovered were just too preposterous to suggest there was still the possibility that more of the obfuscation that the inspectors had become accustomed to was still going to be effective.  Mr. Gray instead chose the truculent defense we see in Exhibit V, and from then on attempted to avoid the inspectors if at all possible. 
The fact is that the Trustee could simply have corrected the security problems and carried on working with the inspectors.  Nothing else of any substance had changed to that point, as far as the inspectors were concerned.  Eating a little crow over the security may actually have further ingratiated the Trustee to the inspectors.  Again in hindsight, and now with the quite startling revelation that Campbell Saunders has been keeping vital information secret from the inspectors for the past two and half years, we can only conclude that some other important information had come to the attention of the Trustee.  Given the fine working relationship we had with the Trustee just prior to the incident and the sudden and complete reversal thereafter we can only conclude that the information coming into his possession was obtained by him during his week to ten day absence that he indicates ended on the day of the “incident”.  Prior to his leaving for this absence he told us he was going to the British West Indies.  That’s where we must assume this new information came into his possession.
Before moving on to suggest other Offences by Bankrupts as detailed in Section 198 of the Act, we must again draw your attention to the Campbell Saunders Client Billing Worksheet comprising Exhibit R.  Campbell Saunders was hired by the Royal Bank to serve as Receiver of Rents for the Estates before being appointed Trustee of the Bankrupt Companies.  We can reasonably assume that this task was one of negotiating landlord tenant arrangements, collecting rents and submitting these rents to the Royal Bank, net of the Receiver’s fees and expenses.  A review of Exhibit R will show that though this was given the creditors in support of a claim on the Estates by Campbell Saunders for services rendered as Trustee of the Bankrupt Companies, the activities therein constitute a complete commingling of Receiver of Rents and Trustee activities.  In fact, in the time sheet details included in pages 36 through 45, covering the period of almost a year and a half from July 16, 2001 to October 25, 2002 there appears to be only one hour of work performed relevant to the trusteeship, this work on the last of these pages done by someone abbreviated as TEMP.                          
    The following offenses from Section 198 have already been essentially covered:

(b)    makes any fraudulent disposition of his property before or after bankruptcy;


(c)    refuses or neglects to answer fully and truthfully all proper questions put to him at any examination held pursuant to this Act;


(d)    makes a false entry or knowingly makes a material omission in a statement or accounting;


As to (b), we consider cash to be “property” and the substantial payments to a principal and his family “dispositions”.  Campbell Saunders has kept us from the records that would confirm what was fraudulent.  We are still at a loss to explain why “proper questions” under oath were never asked.  In fact, our having been given so few records of the bankrupt companies while at the same time having been given so many records of the wholly owned subsidiaries where there was obviously much subterfuge in progress has led some of us to conclude that the financial officer among the bankrupts’ principals is anxious to be put under oath, get his life back in order, and his professional accreditations returned to him.  Had he not given us these unsolicited records we may very well have given up long ago.  We would not have tweaked to the cunning of these principals and their professional consorts because we had never asked for the records providing the proof we now set before you.  It’s difficult to point to a “false entry” or a “material omission in a statement or accounting” when statements are missing.  However, the accountants among us can verify that they have never seen the sort of bookkeeping carried on by the bankrupts done for any legal purpose.
    Offenses under Section 198, subsection (e), as will be seen from a review of Exhibit W, would appear to have been very much on the minds of the bankrupts and their advisors.  What is particularly disturbing is that the bankrupts would seem to have known well in advance the date they would select for seeking protection under the Bankruptcy & Insolvency Act by filing their Notice of Intention to file a proposal, namely May 10, 1999.  Section 198, (e) indicates an offence has been committed by a bankrupt who:

(e)    after or within twelve months immediately preceding his bankruptcy, conceals, destroys, mutilates, falsifies, makes an omission in or disposes of, or is privy to the concealment, destruction, mutilation, falsification, omission from or disposition of, a book or document affecting or relating to his property or affairs, unless he proves that he had no intent to conceal his affairs;   

    
Exhibit W is an exchange of faxes and correspondence between the bankrupts and a large unsecured creditor who is accepting an agreement for dumping privileges at the wholly owned subsidiary in exchange for forgiveness of the unsecured credit.   The exchange includes arrangements to backdate the agreement, resulting in revised agreements dated one year plus two days prior to May 10, 1999, the critical date in these proceedings.  This seems an act of falsification to facilitate a preferential payment.
    Again, we are lay people.  There are three remaining Offences by Bankrupts listed in Section 198, specifically saying that an offence is committed by

    Any bankrupt who:
(f)    after or within twelve months immediately preceding his bankruptcy, obtains any credit or any property by false representations made by him or made by another person to his knowledge;

(g)    after or within twelve months immediately preceding his bankruptcy, fraudulently conceals or removes any property of a value of fifty dollars or more or any debt due to or from him; or

(h)    after or within twelve months immediately preceding his bankruptcy, pawns, pledges or disposes of any property that he has obtained on credit and has not paid for, unless in the case of a trader the pawning, pledging or disposing is in the ordinary way of trade and unless in any case he proves that he had no intent to defraud.


We enclose in Exhibit Y material relating to the transfer of a half million dollars in accounts receivable from a wholly owned subsidiary of the bankrupts to the bankrupts’ lawyers, a sequence of events that occurred between the May 10, 1999 date of the filing of Notice of Intention and the first meeting of creditors to consider the last Proposal.  The amount covers outstanding fees, as excerpted from the claims in the lists of Unsecured Creditors of the Estates (see also Exhibit F) is on the first page in Exhibit Y.  The inspectors received fragmented records so the presentation in Exhibit Y is admittedly fragmented as well, and could perhaps have been sequenced differently. 
    From page 16 to the end of Exhibit Y is a series of memoranda updating the Trustee and inspectors on the progress one of the inspectors was making in evaluating material received relating to Delta Shake & Shingle (1989) Ltd., and asking for their assistance or guidance in various matters.  Of particular interest was the $40 in cheques shown on pages 21 through 23, and summarized on the deposit on page 26.  We are unclear as to the significance of the fact that these cheques total less than the $50 crime limit in Section 198 (g) as quoted above. 
On pages 2 through 15 are correspondence relating to the assignment of the wholly owned subsidiary’s receivable to the lawyers, and the relinquishing of its security position to the lawyers by Westminster Savings Credit Union.  In addition to the apparent preferential payment taken by the lawyers:
1. Assignments such as the various ones described here are normally registered so that anyone doing a corporate search would be aware of their existence.  Hence, both KPMG and Campbell Saunders must have known that the apparently preferential payment had been made.
2. We have to ask ourselves why Campbell Saunders did not disclose all this to the inspectors as they struggled to understand what was going on, as demonstrated in pages 16 through 48.  Even if on the off chance that Campbell Saunders hadn’t done a corporate search on Delta Shake & Shingle (1989) Ltd. they had at least had the correspondence and all the details since September 18, 2000, as seen in pages 2 through 12.
3. No one in authority, and no “officers of the court” ever concerned themselves about the underlying transactions between North Shore Disposal Ltd. and Delta Shake & Shingle (1989) Ltd. and the fact that GST was being accrued but not paid, GVRD environmental levies were being accrued but not paid, and Waste Management landfill records were not likely being maintained. 
4. The Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy knew all of the above.

    Exhibit Z has been enclosed simply to demonstrate how hopeless has been the attempt to communicate with the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.  The concept that “officers of the court” might be abusing their positions appears simply beyond the Superintendent’s comprehension or willingness to come to grips with.  A list of court dates for gatherings on the Proposals is also enclosed, should reference to those events seem useful.       

IN THE MATTER OF THE BANKRUPTCIES OF
NO.289 TAURUS VENTURES LTD.& PREMA SYSTEMS LTD. & 544553 B.C. LTD.

Index of Available Exhibits

A    The Proposal of November 18, 1999.
B    Information known to the Trustee Under the Proposal as being very critical of the principals in the Bankruptcies.
C    Letter from Campney & Murphy articulating the “untrustworthy nature of the principals of these companies as well as various other matters with respect to their morality and credibility.”, and that Campney & Murphy “…believed KPMG to be in a position of conflict.” 
D    The Confirmation of Credit Facilities for the bankrupts’ construction loan.
E    The lease with Meier Studios.
F    The Statement of Affairs prepared by KPMG prior to the first meeting of creditors under the Proposal.
G    Letter from inspectors to the Superintendent of Bankruptcy explaining outrages to date and letter of response from the Superintendent to the inspectors.
H    Deficient submission from KPMG purporting to validate their claims on the estates.
I    Failed attempts to get submission in H properly completed.
J    Letter from the Superintendent of Bankruptcy for Canada articulating that wholly owned subsidiaries of the bankrupts are assets of the estates.
K    Cash flow through wholly owned subsidiary, Delta Shake & Shingle Ltd.
L    Principal’s holding company to which large sums were diverted from the bankrupts during the reviewable period for these bankruptcies.
M   Cash flow through wholly owned subsidiary, 546414 B.C. Ltd.
N    Schedule of payments among one of the bankrupt companies, two wholly owned subsidiaries, and the holding company of the most prominent principal in the bankruptcies.
O    Inspectors’ Handbook – prepared by Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada.
P    Section 158 of the Bankruptcy & Insolvency Act, generally titled Duties of Bankrupts.
Q    Letter to inspectors from Campbell Saunders requesting fees.
R    Campbell Saunders Client Billing Worksheet in support of fee request.
S    Demand by Campbell Saunders for banking information thought to relate to one of the principals of the bankrupts.
T    Fax from Campbell Saunders indicating lack of cooperation from creditors’ former lawyer.
U    Rapid Search proof of typographical error in Exhibit R, page 31 of 50.
V    Communiqués relating to the March 11 police incident at the A-frame. 
W    Apparent attempt at preferential payment to Bel Construction.
X    Failed attempt to have SOB help inspectors get principal’s bank records from Campbell Saunders.
Y    Apparent preferential payment to law firms McCarthy Tetrault and Shandro Dixon Edgson.
Z    Court dates.

NOTES: If you want to obtain more information on the above or if you want to contact other contractors/suppliers who have been burned, call us and we will provide names and phone #'s.

If you have a contribution to make to the BLACKLIST (whether this bunch or others), e-mail us - or Tel/FAX the details and we will do an add-on. The objective is to stop leaches such as these NOW so that other legitimate business is not burned.

DECKRANE

- Mobile Crane Services -

Vancouver, BC

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Posted Mar /98, Last updated - February /2004